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Chapter 5
Mandatory Saving Schemes:
Are They an Answer to the Old Age
Security Problem?
Estelle James and Dimitri Vittas
As the world's population ages, old age security systems are being reevalu-
ated. This chapter is part of and draws heavily from a broader study
(World Bank 1994) that analyzes alternative methods of providing old
age security, with an emphasis on developing countries. One important
model is the mandatory retirement saving scheme. These schemes are
motivated by the belief that some people will not save on a voluntary basis
when they are young because they are shortsighted or lack reliable savings
instruments. From the perspective of old age they may wish they had
saved more (time inconsistent preferences) or may become a charge
upon the rest of society (moral hazard). Mandatory saving schemes avert
these problems by forcing people to shift consumption from their earlier
to their later years and by providing financial institutions for this purpose.
Their basic mode ofoperation is as follows. Workers' contributions are
deposited in personal accounts, and benefits depend on these contribu-
tions plus the investment income they earn. These schemes are thus fully
funded defined contribution plans not sponsored or differentiated by
employer. In their purest form, mandatory retirement saving schemes
imply no redistribution; the capital accumulation before retirement
equals the present value ofexpected post-retirement income.
Full funding implies capital accumulation, and a key question is
how these funds are managed and invested. In most mandatory saving
schemes currently operating, the government determines the use of the
funds and sets the rate of return. Examples of such "national provident
funds" are found in Singapore, Malaysia, and several African countries.
These centrally managed plans can involve capital and labor market dis-
tortions and capricious redistributions similar to those in many pub-
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lic defined benefit plans, because required contribution rates may be
high and returns low and uneven. As an alternative, mandatory saving
schemes may be privately and competitively managed, in which case they
are likely to have fewer distortion effects, fewer incentives for evasion,
and less political manipulation. At this point Chile is the only country
that has fully implemented a decentralized mandatory saving scheme,
but several other Latin American countries are in the process of intro-
ducingone.
Like funded occupational plans, mandatory saving schemes can foster
10ng-teFm saving and capital market development. But unlike defined
benefit occupational schemes, they are fully funded by nature rather
than by regulation. Their coverage can be broad. They do not imply
portability problems or inhibit labor mobility. They permit workers to
diversifY risk. And unlike defined contribution occupational schemes,
they allow workers, who bear the investments risk, to choose the invest-
ment manager.
Mandatory saving nevertheless creates a new set of problems. Most
notably, privately managed schemes fail to insure workers against poor
investment performance of the funds, a problem especially great where
many workers have had little financial experience or information. In
addition, they do not assist workers with low lifetime incomes or provide
adequate pensions in the start-up years of the plan. For these reasons, a
decentralized mandatory saving scheme requires a regulatory structure
that protects workers against ill-informed investment choices. And it
must be supplemented by a redistributive public plan that alleviates pov-
erty. Three central dilemmas are posed:
(1) If mandatory schemes are imposed because of myopia among
workers, how can we count on these same workers to make wise
investments decisions?
(2) If governments have mismanaged their centrally administered
pension plans, how can we count on them to regulate private
funds effectively?
(3) If government regulates and guarantees, won't it eventually end
up either controlling or bailing out these funds?
This chapter begins with a brief history of mandatory saving schemes,
followed by a summary of their major design features. Theoretical and
empirical evidence about their effects on the broader economy includes
discussion of labor market, capital market, government fiscal stability,
and the income distribution effects. In some cases we contrast these
effects with those of the more common pay-as-you-go publicly managed
systems. The regulatory structure that may be needed to implement such
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a scheme is also presented, drawing heavily on the Chilean experience. I
Our conclusion, which summarizes the major findings, suggests that pri-
vately managed mandatory saving schemes deserve careful consideration
as an important part of the old age security system in countries with the
human capital, financial markets, and regulatory capacity to run them
effectively or the potential to develop these institutions and capacities
quickly.
Brief History
The first nationally mandated provident fund was established in Malaysia
in 1951; the largest such fund is Singapore's Central Provident Fund
(CPF) , created in 1955. India and Indonesia established provident funds
in the early 1950s, but with limited coverage. Several Mrican countries set
up national provident funds in the 1960s, and several Caribbean and
Pacific island countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Currently some twenty
countries, mostly former British colonies in Mrica, Asia, and the Pacific
and Caribbean islands, have such schemes. These countries, and others
that adopted this model later, had no public pay-as-you-go pillar at the
time they established their national provident funds.
Chile is the only country that has fully replaced an existing public pay-
as-you-go pension scheme with a government-mandated retirement sav-
ing scheme. Chile is also the only country whose mandatory saving pro-
gram is privately managed, initiated in 1981. It is known as the AFP
system, named after the private companies called Administradoras de
Fondos de Pensiones that are authorized to run it. The public pension
system was replaced because of widespread evasion, unsustainably high
contribution rates, and an inequitable benefit structure. One of the main
arguments used by the Chilean authorities to promote the AFP system
was the failure of the public system to maintain the real value of pensions
in inflationary periods. For similar reasons other Latin American coun-
tries, including Peru, Mexico, and Argentina, are now in the process of
partially replacing their financially strained public pension schemes with
a system of the Chilean type. It is curious - although not surprising in
view of their age structures and historical experiences - that this transi-
tion to a mandatory saving scheme is occurring in older Latin American
countries at the same time that several younger African countries are
contemplating a transition in the opposite direction.
How Do Mandatory Retirement Saving Schemes Work?
Designing a mandatory saving scheme requires that policy makers answer
many crucial questions:
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• What should its coverage, wage replacement, and contribution rates
be, and should they be uniform for all workers?
• At what age should workers be allowed to withdraw funds and should
payouts take the form ofannuities or lump sum withdrawals?
• Should management be centralized or decentralized, and if it is de-
centralized, how much choice should workers have?
• What regulations are needed to ensure that funds are prudently man-
aged, and what guarantees should the state provide?
• What is the best way to minimize costs and maximize returns?
• How can a mandatory retirement saving scheme be integrated with
the ,redistributive objectives of the old age system as a whole?
This section explores these issues briefly. The following sections exam-
ine the management and regulatory issues in greater detail.
The Contribution and Target Replacement Rates
In a mandatory saving scheme, the worker's pension is financed by the
saving account that accumulates before retirement and its size depends
on the contribution rate, the growth rate of earnings, the interest rate,
and the number of working and retirement years. If a higher wage re-
placement rate is desired, a higher contribution rate is required. The
required contribution rate rises the longer the retirement period is rela-
tive to the working period (the passivity ratio) and the smaller the rate of
return is relative to the growth rate of real earnings (Table 1).
The required contribution rate is higher in plans that make poor in-
vestments, incur high administrative costs, index pensions to prices or
. wages, or permit accumulated balances to be used for other purposes
such as housing, education, or health care-as is common in national
provident funds. Traditionally, pension specialists have assumed that real
rates of return are about two percentage points higher than the growth
rate of real earnings. But data in World Bank (1994) show that in many
countries over long periods the differential has been greater, giving an
advantage to mandatory saving plans.
A well-run mandatory saving scheme - with a real rate of return two to
three percentage points higher than the growth rate of real earnings, a
passivity ratio of about one-half, and price or wage indexation - requires
a contribution rate of 10 to 15 percent to cover a replacement rate of 40
percent of gross final year salary, survivors' and disability benefits, and
moderate plan expenses (Table 1). A contribution rate much lower than
10 percent will, to a large extent, replace voluntary saving and be used up
in transaction costs, rather than increase retirement income. If people
retire early or withdraw from the labor force for part of their adult years,
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TABLE 1 Contribution Rate Needed to Pay Pension =40% of Final Salary
under Mandatory Saving Scheme I
Non-Inthxed Pension Inthxed
Pension to Prices
Passivity Rate 1/2 1/3 1/2 1/3
Real Wage Growth 0 2 0 3 0 2 0 3
Real Interest Rate
0% 13 18 9 14 20 29 13 20
2% 7 II 5 8 11 16 7 11
5% 3 5 2 3 5 7 3 5
Real Pension Rate at Death 2 15 15 19 19 40 40 40 40
Relative Pension Rate at Death' 15 10 19 14 40 27 40 30
Source: Schwarz (1992); Villas (1992a).
Notes: I Plan expenses and disability and survivors' benefits are not included. These would
raise the required contribution rate three to five percentage points in a well run
plan. A 5 percent inflation rate is assumed. The one halfpassivity rate stems from an
assumption of forty working years and twenty years of retirement. The one third
passivity rate implies 45 working years and 15 years of retirement.
2Real pension in year of death as proportion offinal year's salary.
~Pension relative to average wage at the economy in year ofdeath.
or if the real rate of return is lower than the growth rate ofearnings, or if
objectives are pursued besides saving for retirement, a contribution rate
higher than 15 percent will be required. Differences in the basic param-
eters of the plan, especially the use of funds for purposes other than
retirement, may explain why the contribution rate is as high as 22 percent
in Malaysia and Sri Lanka and 35 percent in Singapore, but only 13
percent in Chile (Table 2).
Should young workers be exempted or permitted to pay lower contri-
bution rates, to offset their lower productivity? What about for older
workers who have passed normal retirement age and peak productivity?
If these workers receive special treatment, higher contribution would
then be required in the middle years, which are generally the high point
of life cycle earnings. Singapore requires a lower contribution rate for
low income workers and recently introduced a lower rate for workers
over the age of 55. This schedule helps smooth consumption over the
worker's lifetime, a major purpose of the scheme.
Investment and Inflation Risk
In mandatory saving schemes workers assume the investment and infla-
tion risks for their own retirement funds. Investment risk arises from
variations in investment performance and is closely related to pension
fund solvency risk. Investment risk is particularly high at the time of
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TABLE 2 Payroll Tax Rates for Mandatory Saving Schemes, 1991
(percentage of wages) I
Combined
Percentage ofWa~ as a PercentageofWagePlw
Country Empluyee Employer Combined Empluyer Tax
Africa
The Gambia 5.0 10.0 15.0 13.6
Ghana2 5.0 12.5 17.5 15.6
Kenya 5.0 5.0 10.0 9.5
Nigeria 6.0 6.0 12.0 11.3
Swaziland 5.0 5.0 10.0 9.5
Tanzania 10.0 10.0 20.0 18.2
Uganda 5.0 10.0 15.0 13.6
Zambia 5.0 5.0 10.0 9.5
Asia
Fiji 7.0 7.0 14.0 13.1
India 10.0 10.0 20.0 18.2
Indonesia 1.0 2.0 3.0 2.9
Kiribati 5.0 5.0 10.0 9.5
Malaysia 9.0 11.0 20.0' 18.0
Nepal 10.0 10.0 20.0 18.2
Singapore 25.0' 10.0 35.0 32.0
Solomon Islands 5.0 7.5 12.5 11.6
Sri Lanka 8.0 12.0 20.0 17.9
Western Samoa 5.0 5.0 10.0 9.5
Latin America (1994)5
Argentina 11.0 0.0 11.0 11.0
Chile 13.0 0.0 13.0 13.0
Colombia 2.9 8.6 11.5' 10.6
"Peru 13.3 0.0 13.3 13.3
Source: Social Security Administration (1993); Columbia (1993); World Bank (1994).
Notes: I African and Asian schemes are publicly managed provident funds; Latin American
schemes are privately managed.
2'The provident fund is being converted to a social insurance scheme.
'This was raised to 22 percent in 1993.
4The contribution varies from seven to 30 percent of gross wages for workers.
'For Argentina and Colombia a new plan started in 1994, for Peru in 1993.
'This will rise gradually to 14.5 percent in 1996.
retiremen.t, when many workers use their accumulated assets to purchase
a lifetime annuity; the level of interest rates and the state of the financial
market on the date the annuity is purchased are critical. As we will see
below, it is important that schemes include some method of spreading
this risk across time.
As for inflation risk, an important question is whether pensioners
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should be required to purchase indexed annuities and, if so, whether
they should be indexed to wages or prices. Indexed annuities cost more
than non-indexed annuities, whether in higher contribution rates or in
lower initial benefit payments (Table I), but they maintain the pension's
real value. In a mandatory saving scheme individual workers pay the cost
of their own indexation, whereas in a pay-as-you-go scheme, current
workers bear this risk to protect current retirees. Whether private com-
panies will be willing or able to guarantee indexed pensions is another
matter.
Publicly managed pay-as-you-go defined benefit plans are supposed to
protect retirees by transferring these risks to the more adaptable younger
generation. In reality, however, retirees are never entirely protected. "De-
fined" benefits are never completely defined over the long run. They
are rarely fully indexed against inflation in developing countries; even
OECD countries have skipped cost of living increases in recent years.
Thus participants in both types of plans face variants of these risks, and
the variants are only partially correlated. For example, mandatory saving
plans can invest in equities and real property (whose nominal values
generally rise with inflation), in foreign assets (thereby avoiding country-
specific shocks), and in indexed instruments (thereby passing inflation
risk on those who are willing to bear it). Pay-as-you-go plans do not have
these options. Consequently, it is not clear which type of the plan will
provide the best inflation insurance and a mixture of the two may reduce
risk through diversification.
Centralized or Decentralized Management
In capital-scarce middle income countries, an efficient system of forced
long-term saving can lead to high rates of return and economic growth-
if the savings are channeled to productive uses and away from precau-
tionary or speculative investments in real estate, precious metals, and
land. Risks, costs, and rate of return are strongly influenced by whether
the fund is centralized or decentralized. In their ideal state, centralized
provident funds that are run by the national government invest produc-
tively and benefit from economies of scale that minimize operating costs.
Singapore and Malaysia are examples of national provident funds that
have low costs and earn stable, though modest, returns. However, more
typically, managers ofcentralized provident funds, which are compulsory
monopolies, may have little incentive to operate efficiently or to earn
reasonable returns - and may be subject to political pressures to invest
unproductively (see Table 3 and Figure 1).
Decentralized competitive plans, by contrast, face market pressures to
operate efficiently and maximize returns and are at least partially insu-
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TABLE 3 Operating Costs and Investment Returns
Chile Malaysia Singapore Zamma
Cost or Returns 1990 1989 1990 1988-89
Operating Costs as Percentage of:
Annual Contributions 15.40 1.99 0.53 51.73
Average Total Assets 2.30 0.18 0.10 6.80
Covered Annual Wages 1.54 0.40 0.21 5.17
Affiliates Times Per Capita Income 2.31 0.54 0.16 4.48
Real Investment Returns on
Individual Accounts Net of Fees 9.2 4.6 3.0 -23.4
Period for Investment Returns 1981 to 90 1980 to 90 1980 to 90 1980 to 88
Source: World Bank (1994); Asher (l992a and b); Vittas (l992b). Calculations of investment returns by
Wo'rld Bank staff.
lated from political pressures to misallocate capital. Workers choose the
fund in which they want to place their savings, presumably based on its
record of returns and risk. But these plans require a complex regulatory
structure to ensure the financial soundness and integrity of funds man-
agers and to prevent workers from making big mistakes. Regulating de-
centralized mandatory saving schemes requires considerable human
capital and institutional capacity, including the ability to enact clear rules
and penalize malfeasance in predictable ways. Some elements ofmodern
financial markets are also needed, though these are likely to develop in
response to the scheme. For countries that satisfY these criteria, privately
managed mandatory saving plans deserve careful consideration.
Impact on the Broader Economy
Proponents of the mandatory saving pillar argue that these plans have
beneficial effects on the broader economy, while critics argue that the
effects are minimal or even negative. Among the important effects to
consider are the impacts on long-term saving, capital allocation, labor
markets, income distribution, poverty reduction, and the government's
fiscal position.
Implications for Capital Markets
The mandatory saving pillar can be an important instrument for acceler-
ating capital market development, increasing long-term saving, boosting
investment in productive capital formation, and monitoring corporate
performance. If the current rates of long-term saving and capital ac-
cumulation are below optimal levels - as many analysts believe - such
changes have the potential to enhance economic growth.
zambia
(1980-88)
Kenya
(1980-90)
India
(1980-90)
Singapore
(1980-90)
Malaysia
(1980-90)
Chilean (AFPs)
(1980-90)
-40
-23.5
-30 -20
: -3.8
-10 o
0.3
10
Percentage of rate of return after inflation
Figure I. Average annual real investment returns for selected mandatory savings schemes (simple averages).
All funds publicly managed except Chilean AFPs. For provident funds, rates are credited to members. Source:
World Bank (1994).
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Impact on National Saving
One of the most hotly debated issues in pension economics is the effect
of pay-as-you-go versus funded schemes on household and national sav-
ing. Some analysts argue that pension schemes have no effect on total na-
tional saving, that consumers substitute taxes or saving under the scheme
for other forms of saving. Other analysts maintain that pay-as-you-go
schemes reduce national saving while funded pension schemes displace
some personal saving but not on a one for one basis, so total national
saving increases.2
The crowding out of voluntary saving may be only partial because
people are shortsighted and will not save as much on their own for old
age. Some of their voluntary saving may be for bequests or for precau-
tionary motives, which are not easily satisfied by mandatory retirement
saving schemes. Limits on consumer borrowing may prevent people from
dissaving against future pension benefits. Workers may opt for earlier
retirement than the system allows; so they may have to continue saving
outside the mandatory system. And people may have little faith in the
new system, and hence treat their contributions as a tax and continue to
save privately for their old age.
The influence of each of these factors is likely to vary by country.
Crowding out would be expected to be more substantial in countries
where the voluntary saving rate is high, as in most East Asian countries,
and smaller in countries where it is low, as in eastern Europe, where
private saving was unknown under socialism, or in Latin America, where
saving has been discouraged by inflation. Crowding out would be less for
poor and young workers, who save little on their own. Also, as the system
matures, covered workers begin to retire and dissave their accumulated
assets; so the increase in natural saving comes to a halt, albeit at a higher
leVel of capital stock than before.
Overall, then, it seems likely that a mandatory saving scheme will in-
crease saving relative to the situation with no mandatory scheme, but the
effect may not be large. However, the positive effect on saving is likely to
be much greater relative to a mandatory pay-as-you-go scheme. A pay-as-
you-go scheme gives a windfall consumption gain to the first few cohorts
of covered workers, and may thereby reduce national saving (other fac-
tors remaining unchanged), while a funded scheme does not. The very
factors that offset this negative effect of pay-as-you-go plans - myopia,
capital market imperfections, increased saving for early retirement, pre-
cautionary motives for saving, and lack of faith in the pension system-
tend to increase the positive effect of mandatory saving on saving. In
Chile private saving went up sharply in the decade after the mandatory
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saving scheme was introduced, but because many other factors were
changing at the same time it is difficult to pin down how much of the
higher saving, if any, was due to the mandatory saving scheme.
In sum, the arguments seem strong for expecting a mandatory retire-
ment saving scheme to have a more positive effect on capital growth than
a pay-as-you-go scheme - but the size of the effect is difficult to predict.
Impact on Long-Term Savings
Perhaps more important is the shift in the composition ofsavings in favor
of long-term financial assets controlled by large financial institutions.
How quickly long-term resources are accumulated depends on the age of
the system, its coverage, and the levels ofcontributions. In Singapore the
resources of the Central Provident Fund rose from 28 percent of GOP in
1976 to 76 percent (despite large withdrawals for housing). In Malaysia
the balances of the Employees Provident Fund increased from 18 percent
of GOP in 1980 to 41 percent in 1987. In Chile resources in the AFP
systems totaled 35 percent of GOP by 1991, often ten years of operation
(Table 4).
Thus the mandatory saving pillar can generate substantial long-term
financial savings in a relatively short time. Consider the case in which
labor income represents 50 percent of national income. A compulsory
scheme covering 50 percent of the labor force and imposing a 10 percent
contribution rate would annually accumulate funds equal to 2.5 percent
of national income. If the rate of return on fund balances equals the rate
ofgrowth ofGNP (and because pension payouts would be minimal in the
early years of operation), such a scheme would accumulate resources
equal to 12.5 percent of GNP over five years and 25 percent over ten
years. After the first ten years the growing volume of benefits payments
would slow the pace ofaccumulation, although expanded coverage and a
rising share of labor income would accelerate the rate of accumulation.
In the very long run - in a closed economy, and even in an open
economy if funded plans become commonplace - the marginal produc-
tivity of capital and the real rate of return may tumble as long-term
savings accumulate. At some point the productivity of capital may fall so
far that further high saving is no longer efficient. Since the problem in
many countries and from a worldwide point of view now appears to be a
scarcity rather than an overabundance of capital, this effect is far off in
the future. It can be further forestalled by international diversification,
investment in human capital that is complementary to physical capital
shifts of labor from the informal to the formal sector, and capital-inten-
sive technological change.
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TABLE 4 Assets of Selected National Provident Funds (percentage ofGDP) I
Most Year
Country 1983 !Weent Availabk
Singapore 53.8 75.6 199]
Malaysia 24.4 40.8 1991
Solomon Island 15.4
Zambia 9.1 5.8 1989
Sri Lanka 8.1 15.2 1990
Swaziland 6.0 5.4 1987
epal 3.8
India 1.9 4.5 1990
Indonesia' 1.0 1.4 1990
Ghana' 0.6 ]986
FUi 43.9 ]987
Nigeria 0.7 1988
Barbados 16.0 ]986
Kenya 11.5 1989
Source: World Bank (1994).
Notes: 1Refers to main provident fund in each country.
'Refers to both public employees' and national provident funds.
!Provident funds are being replaced by social insurance systems.
Impact on Capital Allocation
Establishing a mandatory savings scheme presents an opportunity to
stimulate capital markets and expand the supply of productive capital.
Nevertheless, the allocation and productivity of this capital depends on
whether the funds are publicly or privately managed. Most centrally man-
aged provident funds have been invested in government bonds or in
failing public enterprises at low nominal interest rates that become nega-
tive during inflationary periods. This is also true of centrally managed
reserves of defined benefit plans (World Bank 1994). If government has
exclusive access to the funds, spends them wastefully, and pays workers
an arbitrary interest rate, the potential advantages of mandatory saving
schemes are lost. In fact, such schemes become very much like pay-as-you-
go schemes in their capital and labor market effects.
Because of the fungibility ofmoney once it becomes part of the govern-
ment budget, the real productivity ofthese provident funds is not known.
The funds may increase government consumption or investment beyond
what they would have been otherwise - or they may substitute for explicit
taxes while holding government spending unchanged. Each has a dif-
ferent impact on national output and its composition and distribution. It
is known, however, that the real returns credited to worker accounts was
around zero in India and highly negative in Zambia and other Mrican
countries (Figure 1). So, for the worker, these systems have failed. And
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for the broader economy, their allocations have not been subject to any
competitive market test or even public scrutiny.
Even in Singapore, more than 90 percent of fund assets have been
invested in non-tradable government securities with an average rate of
retum of 3 percent in the 1980s (Asher 1992b), similar to that on 12-
month time deposits and less than what long-term contractual savings
could have earned in the market. The Singapore government claims that
it has used these funds productively, both domestically and for invest-
ments in foreign assets, but these returns have not gone to the provident
fund. The relatively low interest rate paid to the fund could thus be
viewed as a hidden tax on workers to finance general government expen-
ditures and reserves.
Most countries with national provident funds allow employees to use
part of their balances for housing and other specified purposes, and
Singapore now allows limited investments in approved private sector se-
curities. Members are obliged to redeposit the funds with the provident
fund if they sell the houses or other investments (Asher 1992a). This use
offunds has a positive effect on home ownership and the housing market
but reduces the impact of national provident funds as a source ofproduc-
tive capital investment and retirement income. It is not clear that manda-
tory saving for housing is justified on efficiency grounds.
By contrast, in a decentrally managed competitive system such as that
in Chile, workers pick their management company from a small number
ofauthorized AFPs and can transfer their accounts from one company to
another. This gives decision-making authority to workers, who are clearly
interested in maximizing returns and minimizing risk, and avoids the
problem of eaming below market returns and encouraging excess gov-
ernment spending. But workers may not have the information needed to
make wise choices. Their investments may be too risky in some cases and
too conservative in others; so they may eventually become charges on the
rest of the society. To counter this problem, the Chilean government has
imposed strict regulations to protect the safety and profitability of invest-
ments (see below).
Given the decentralized management and the block on personal with-
drawals, the Chilean pension system has become a dominant player in
the capital market - a force facilitating privatization and growth. Initially
the AFPs invested predominantly in government bonds, but gradually
they shifted to corporate securities - especially equities, as the Chilean
stock market boomed and investment rules were liberalized (Vittas and
Iglesias 1992). Now the government must compete for access to funds
and pay the competitive market price. The AFP system also invested
heavily in the privatization of public utilities in the mid-1980s, accounting
for 10 to 35 percent of the equity capital of the privatized utilities - and
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even more of the domestically held equity capital. By 1991, 38 percent of
AFP funds were in state securities, 24 percent in corporate equities, and
about 13 percent each in corporate bonds and bank deposits. AFPs hold
more than one-third of all public bonds, two-thirds of all private sector
bonds, and 10 percent of all corporate equities in the country (Superin-
tendencia de AFPs, Banco Central Chile).
Perhaps more important, the pension system has stimulated the de-
velopment of other institutions and practices that have deepened Chil-
ean financial markets over the past decade. These include modern
bank supervision, new securities and corporation laws, increased disclo-
sure requirements for public companies, risk classification agencies for
bonds, a long-term corporate bond market and a second stock market,
new types of mortgage bonds, and improved regulation of insurance
companies.
The rate of return to workers in the Chilean system has been much
higher than in countries with centrally managed mandatory saving pil-
lars. During the first ten years, the gross annual real return averaged 13
. percent, and the average net yield to workers, after fees, was about 9.2
percent. albeit with large variations among different funds and individ-
uals (Acuna and Iglesias 1992). Such high gross returns cannot be ex-
pected in the long run, but the high start-up costs of the first two years
also will not contiuue; they have already been reduced from 14.7 percent
of assets in 1982 to 1.6 percent in 1992. Overall, this experience is consis-
tent with the observation that decentralized funded plans have earned
far higher returns than centralized plans - perhaps reflecting their com-
petitive nature and the market tests for their allocations.
Pension Fund Concentration and Corporate Governance
Mandatory pension funds, if invested in the private sector, could even-
tually come to dominate the ownership of financial assets that represent
claims on the economy's real assets -land, housing, stock, commercial
property, and industrial equipment. This ownership structure has im-
plications for corporate governance, since pension funds would become
major stockholders and could exercise voting rights and power over cor-
porate management.
The concentration ofownership means that mandatory pension funds
could not simply buy and sell shares without disrupting the market, as
smaller investors can do. It also makes it worthwhile for them to incur the
costs of gathering and processing information, which they can use to
monitor the management performance ofcorporations, thereby estimat-
ing corporate efficiency. On the other side of the coin, that may give a
small number of pension funds an influential voice in interlocking direc-
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torates, an anti-competitive force in strategic corporate decisions. Cen-
tralized provident funds are even more concentrated. If these funds were
to invest in corporate equities, public officials could gain control of cor-
porate affairs, a back door to nationalization.
In Chile, the three largest companies account for more than 60 per-
cent of total funds and a big chunk of total corporate equity. So far, the
AFPs have not attempted to monitor or control corporations, and pub-
licly managed provident funds have not invested in private corporations.
But funded plans in other countries are doing so. In the United States,
funded occupational plans have begun to monitor the governance of the
corporations in which they have an ownership stake. Because this chan-
nel allows pension funds to have a far-reaching influence on the econ-
omy, it becomes particularly important for them to be concentrated-
but not too concentrated - and to have incentives that encourage the
right performance from corporations.
Implications for Labor Markets
Mandatory saving plans, unlike public or occupational plans (particu-
larly defined benefit plans), have relatively little impact on the labor
market. Since workers eventually recoup their contributions, with inter-
est, they are less likely to see savings as taxes, to be evaded. And since they
"own" their accounts, they can carry them along from onejob to another
with no penalty for mobility. In this sense, the important story is that
there is relatively little labor market story, compared with the other types
of plans.
Even so, some distortions remain. First, when contribution rates are
much higher than households' desired saving rates (presumably the rea-
son for a mandatory scheme), incentives are created to evade by shifting
to the informal market, understating covered wages, and substituting in-
kind benefits for wages. When interest rates are below market, as is often
the case for provident funds, this effect is exacerbated. Ifworkers cannot
evade they may be induced, by their higher accumulated savings and com-
pulsory savings rate, to retire early. Thus, mandatory saving plans may
reduce the supply of labor, especially experienced labor, in the formal
sector. In addition, wage rigidities may prevent employers from shifting
their share of the payroll tax to workers - and may decrease employment
instead. Singapore seems to have experienced this effect in 1984, when it
raised the contribution rate to 50 percent of wages, shared equally by
employers and employees. The employers' rate was cut in half the follow-
ing year because of the belief that this had affected employment ad-
versely. Both these factors imply a tax element that distorts the labor
market and limits the efficient contribution rate.
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Fiscal Implications
A mandatory saving plan also has few fiscal implications than a pay-as-
you-go public plan since workers receive only the value of their contri-
butions plus investment earnings. Political pressure to increase public
spending on pension benefits is absent. In fact, governments have bor-
rowed from provident funds at below market interest rates, cutting future
pension benefits and current public borrowing costs. But these low rates
could increase public deficits if they induce the government to spend
more on other goods and services. The danger is that the spending,
financed by a hidden tax on workers, may not be productive. (This is
similar to the problem posed by large reserves in a partly funded public
plan.) Decentralized schemes that charge market rates avoid this prob-
lem. But if the government guarantees their benefits, this constitutes
another state obligation that could become surprisingly large if strategic
manipulation and moral hazard are not controlled.
Another important fiscal effect stems from the tax treatment of pen-
sion savings. Tax incentives are not essential for mandatory schemes, but
they improve compliance and are therefore common. The tax loss may
force the government to reduce spending or to raise other taxes, which
could have a high efficiency cost (Valdes-Prieto and Cifuentes 1993).
Contributions to most mandatory saving schemes are deductible for
income tax, as is the current investment income from the funds. Workers
in Chile are allowed to contribute additional amounts on a voluntary tax-
exempt basis. In most schemes, withdrawals are subject to tax, like any
other income. The benefits of tax deferral are greater for higher income
workers, because their initial tax savings are higher and they are likely to
be in a lower tax bracket after retirement. To avoid this perverse re-
distribution, limits may be placed on the tax-advantaged benefits or a tax
credit may be offered rather than making contributions tax-deductible,
as has been proposed for occupational plans.
Malaysia and Singapore exempt the contributions and the withdraw-
als-as well as the interest earned in between-from taxation. The total
tax benefits ofSingapore's national provident fund (and the government
tax revenue forgone) were estimated at slightly more than one percent of
GOP for 1987, ro\lghly the tax expenditures for the United States occupa-
tional pension system (Turner and Beller 1989). The Singapore fund
thus pr~vides a valuable tax shelter for contributors, especially high in-
come workers who would be subject to higher marginal tax rates on other
investment income (Queisser 1991). The higher tax benefits received by
upper income groups may be one reason they go along with the high
contribution rates and low interest rates.
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Redistributive Effects and Poverty
Because of the direct link between contributions and benefits, manda-
tory saving plans, in principle, do not involve redistribution either across
or within generations. Non-transparent and perverse redistributions can
still occur, however, particularly in centrally managed pension funds, so
the system needs to be designed to avoid this possibility.
If the government borrows from provident funds at below market rates,
in lieu of increased taxes to finance general public expenditures, this has
a redistributional effect since the incidence of the payroll tax is not the
same as that ofgeneral revenue taxes and is generally more regressive. Or,
if the government uses the funds to finance public expenditure; that it
would not otherwise have undertaken, income is redistributed from fund
contributors to the beneficiaries of the additional government spending.
Such transfers are difficult to trace (doing so requires knowing what
would have happened had the funds not been available) -which is pre-
ciselywhy the transfers are likely to benefit privileged groups, who are in a
position to influence gove,·nment transactions.
Allowing contributors to withdraw funds before retirement also bene-
fits middle and upper income groups. Singapore's national provident
fund permits early withdrawals for education, home ownership, and al-
ternative investments as long as contributors maintain a minimum bal-
ance in the plan, a condition few low income workers can meet. In some
countries plan members are permitted to borrow against their savings at
below market rates for specified purchases - an option that again is used
mainly by high income groups. A more competitive system for investing
pension funds, yielding a higher rate of return, would reduce this prob-
lem of perverse redistribution.
Perverse redistribution may also result if retiring workers are com-
pelled to purchase annuities that pool people with long and short life
expectancies. Public policies that prohibit distinctions among different
demographic and socioeconomic groups in setting the terms ofannuities
and life insurance contracts have this effect. For example, if regulations
require that retiring mine workers and white collar employees pay the
same price for annuities, the result would be regressive. This effect could
be offset by reducing annuity prices for lower socioeconomic groups, by
topping up their accounts directly, or by paying large benefits to their
survivors. Similarly, regulations that pool men and women redistribute
expected lifetime income from the former to the latter, who live longer.
Most mandatory saving schemes avoid this problem by paying lump
sums instead of annuities on retirement. But this means they do not
provide longevity insurance and do not protect the very old against pov-
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erty. Chile gives workers a choice between purchasing an annuity or
taking phased withdrawals that are scheduled to last an expected lifetime
and that avoid the redistribution problem. Chile also requires all em-
ployees to purchase term life and disability insurance, in which mine
workers get a net benefit if they are in the same pool with white collar
workers.
Another problem with mandatory retirement saving schemes is their
failure to protect low wage workers with interrupted careers, such as
women, who may never accumulate enough in their pension accounts to
support themselves in old age. Along similar lines, the pensions may fall
below subsistence standards because of inflation or low investment re-
turns. For that reason, mandatory saving can leave considerable old age
poverty.
Some of these possible sources of poverty can be handled without
public transfers. In Chile, the purchase ofprivate disability insurance and
term life insurance is compulsory. Most provident funds do not provide
or require such insurance, leaving survivors and disabled workers largely
unprotected and poor. Regulations could require joint contributions and
joint ownership of retirement savings accounts between spouses, protect-
ing women whose labor force participation has been interrupted. Be-
yond that, governments can deal with the problems oflong-term poverty
alleviation and extreme investment risk by guaranteeing a minimum
pension based on years of employment - or by redistributive social assis-
tance programs; this might be considered an accompanying role of the
public plan. Chile provides such assistance and guarantees, financing
them from general tax revenues.
Regulatory Issues in Decentralized Schemes
Decentralized competitive systems are more likely than centralized provi-
dent funds to maximize investment returns and contribute to capital
market development. But decentralized plans raise a host ofpublic policy
issues related to the fiduciary standards of pension companies, the safety
of their investments, the range of products offered and of information
disclosed, the size of fees and commissions, the kind of advertising and
other marketing expenses incurred, the guarantees provided by govern-
ment, and the regulatory apparatus needed to monitor all these ele-
ments. Extensive regulation is needed because workers often lack the
expertise heeded to invest wisely. Private pension companies, if left un-
checked, might mislead their members or might take too many risks in
order to maximize yield and attract new accounts, or might be too conser-
vative to keep up with inflation. Given the long-term nature of pension
investments, once the damage becomes evident it may be too late for the
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worker to recover financially through new saving. Trying to remedy this
flaw through government guarantees may create moral hazard problems,
if the guarantees exacerbate a tendency toward risky investments. Regula-
tions are designed to protect both individual workers and society from
perverse competition in the face of information deficiencies. This pro-
tection is particularly important in a mandatory program.
Can governments be counted on to regulate decentralized systems
well, having already shown that they cannot control centralized pension
funds very well? And, at what point does a strict regulatory structure wipe
out competition and become government control? The experience of
Chile is used to explore what kinds of regulations are workable and
may - or may not - be advisable.
Ensuring the Solvency of Funds and the Integrity of Managers
Which funds qualifY as custodians of mandatory saving accounts? To
ensure competent and responsible administration of pension funds and
to protect their solvency, criteria must be established on entry and mini-
mum capital margin and fund managers must be vetted by the super-
visory authorities. The shortage of local expertise in many developing
countries can be overcome by using foreign fund management com-
panies in joint ventures with local firms. Developing countries that are
reluctant to use joint ventures may have a hard time assembling the
expertise needed to run pension funds well, especially in the early years.
Chile limits participation in the mandatory scheme to the Admin-
istradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, or AFPs, specialized pension fund
management companies. The AFPs are regulated and supervised by the
Superintendency of AFPs, which has authority over charter approval.
The AFPs are set up as joint-stock companies. Any group ofshareholders,
including large corporations, trade associations, labor unions, and other
financial institutions (but not banks), can establish an AFP. Until re-
cently, the three largest AFPs, serving about two-thirds of the market,
were joint ven tures.
The pension fund is an independent entity, segregated both legally
and financially from the AFP and its other activities. The assets of the
pension fund belong exclusively to individual members, are not attach-
able, and are not affected by any financial losses suffered by the AFP. AFPs
are required to maintain investment reserves equal to one percent ofthe
total assets of the pension fund they manage. Reserves must be invested
in the same assets as the pension fund under AFP management to ensure
that AFPs apply the same professionalism in investing the resources of the
pension fund as they do for the AFP's own resources. Pension funds are
valued daily at market prices (much like mutual funds) or, for assets for
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which there are no daily market values, according to a valuation model
developed by the Superintendency ofAFPs.
In Chile, workers choose their own AFP and are permitted to switch
their accumulated balances to another AFP if they are dissatisfied, creat-
ing competition among AFPs. To simplifY matters, regulations impose a
strict limit of one account per worker and one fund per management
company. These regulations are very restrictive - and controversial. Al-
lowing workers to have accounts with more than one company would
let them hedge their bets and reduce their dependence on the perfor-
mance of a single company. Similarly, allowing management companies
to operate a wider range of funds would allow them to tailor products
to different tastes and age groups. For instance, equity funds might ap-
peal to younger workers, mixed stock/bond funds to middle-aged work-
ers, and money market funds to older workers. The unit account-unit
fund rule reduces variety and choice, two of the potential advantages of
-competition.
These two restrictions are aimed at preserving the simplicity and trans-
parency of the system, characteristics that are considered important for a
compulsory scheme involving large numbers of financially unsophisti-
cated people. Allowing companies to manage a wider range of invest-
ment funds would complicate compliance monitoring. For example, it
would become more difficult to prevent withdrawals or a concentration
of workers' portfolios in risky assets. As the system matures, and workers
gain financial experience, regulations may become less restrictive. But in
the meantime, the cost of simplified regulations is the loss of choice and
risk diversification.
Keeping Investment Risk Within Reasonable Bounds
Financial regulation aims to ensure fairness for all participants, including
protection from fraudulent or imprudent behavior by the managers of
financial institutions - a task that assumes particular importance in man-
datory retirement saving schemes because of their compulsory nature
and long-term contracts. One way to provide such protection is through
regular disclosure of information. AFPs in Chile are required to provide
statements to contributors three times a year, disclosing the last four
monthly contributions paid by employers, the financial performance of
the pension fund, and the accumulated balance and rate of return on
individual accounts.
PartiCipants are further protected through investment rules. Chile
started out with rigid investment regulations, and gradually eased them
as funds and experience increased. The limits on equity investments, for
Estelle James and Dimitri Vlttas 171
example, have been steadily increased, and investments in overseas se-
curities, which were not allowed initially, have been authorized.
Investment rules are guided by two operating principles: safety and
profitability. Safety implies that pension funds are invested in approved
assets and properly diversified, while profitability implies that fund man-
agement companies are free to seek the highest returns subject to these
rules. Thus only upper limits are imposed on investments, to control the
exposure of pension funds to particular risks. There are no floors re-
quiring purchase of government bonds or other "socially useful invest-
ments." Currently, the upper limits are 50 percent on government bonds,
30 percent on corporate equities, 10 percent on foreign securities, and
similar limits on bank deposits, mortgage loans, and other assets (Vittas
and Iglesias 1992). Ceilings also apply to permissible investments in the
securities of individual companies. Ceilings are higher for "Chapter 12"
companies, which accept severe restrictions on their management inde-
pendence. So far only recently privatized utilities have opted to qualify
for Chapter 12, which has allowed pension funds to play an important
role in their privatization.
The dispersion in returns across AFPs is reduced through the regula-
tion of maximum and minimum returns. If a fund's real investment
return over a rolling 12-month period is 50 percent or two percentage
points higher (whichever yields the higher rate of return) than the aver-
age for all pension funds, the AFP has to place the difference in a prof-
itability reserve, which becomes an asset of the pension fund, not the
AFP. Similarly, if the real investment return for a pension fund is less than
half the average of all pension funds or two percentage points lower
(whichever yields the lower rate of return), the AFP is required to make
up the difference by transferring funds from the profitability reserve
and, if this is inadequate, from its own investment reserves. If an AFP is
unable to make up the shortfall, it is declared bankrupt, its pension fund
assets are transferred to other AFPs, and the government makes up any
remaining difference. So far, the dispersion in returns among AFPs has
been so low that no profitability reserves have been established; three
AFPs have been dissolved or merged because of failure to maintain the
one percent investment reserve.
Maximum and minimum limits on pension fund returns are designed
to protect workers against excessive fluctuations in returns and to avoid
wide dispersion across AFPs. But they may also induce herd behavior,
since firms are penalized for being different, not for being wrong. In
addition, using a 12-month average in calculating returns unduly empha-
sizes short-term performance, an undesirable attribute for long-term
contracts that may span 60 years or more. An AFP that persistently per-
forms at the lower end of the permitted range would produce substan-
tially lower than average returns over a period of many years. An alterna-
tive approach would apply narrower limits (say 25 percent rather than 50
percent) on performance over longer periods of time, say three to five
years. Another alternative would specify the maximum and minimum
returns in terms of the top and bottom 10 percent offunds, or those that
are more than two standard deviations away from the average. The better
informed workers are, the less need there will be for such regulations, as
workers shift savings away from consistently poor performers.
To protect against inflation, pension fund managers could be required
to invest a portion of their portfolios in assets that provide an effective
hedge against inflation, such as equities, real estate, foreign assets, or
indexed bonds. Though Chile does not require indexation by AFPs, this
position is widespread in Chilean financial markets-a response to de-
mand in an environment in which inflation has historically been a prob-
lem. More than 95 percent ofAFP assets are invested in equities, indexed
bonds, or real assets, including indexed bonds issued by banks or private
firm. This counters the common assertion that the private sector cannot
offer indexed securities or ,insure against inflation. Hedging against infla-
tion would be much more difficult, however, in countries with less devel-
oped financial markets, poorly indexed financial instruments, and a high
and volatile inflation rate.
Allowing Investments in Overseas Assets
There are strong advantages to international diversification of pension
funds, particularly for countries with small or concentrated domestic
economies. Lower risk and sometimes higher returns are possible over
the long term through international investment, which reduces the ex-
posure of investors to country-specific risks such as inflation and gives
them an opportunity to move their capital to countries that offer the
highest return. Open capital markets may also impose fiscal discipline
which is badly needtid in some countries. But they also raise fears of
institutionalized capital flight, loss of control by mandatory authorities,
and depriving local markets of the benefits of the increased availabili ty of
long-term funds.
Perhaps because of these fears, few countries with national provident
funds invest abroad, a major reason for negative returns in countries with
high inflation. Singapore is an exception. Using assets borrowed from
the provident fund, among others, two public agencies have invested
abroad, the Monetary Authority ofSingapore in short- and medium-term
securities, and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation in
longer-term foreign equities and other assets. The authorities claim the
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returns on these foreign investments have been high, but the claims
cannot be corroborated since no published data are available and the
accounts of the two agencies are not audited. At any rate the returns go to
the government, not to the provident funds, which receive low interest
rates from the government. Pressures are mounting in Fiji and in Malay-
sia to allow their national provident funds to invest in foreign securities,
since the funds are now large and government borrowing needs have
subsided.
Chile did not allow the AFPs to invest in foreign securities until 1991,
and then only on a gradual schedule, beginning at one percent of funds
and rising to 10 percent (perhaps higher) by 1995. Authorizing invest-
ment in foreign securities represents a recognition of the maturity of the
system, the large size of the pension funds, the saturation of domestic
markets, and the growing need for diversification ofcountry risk. It is also
a response to the large capital inflow that Chile has been experiencing in
recent years. Conversely, liberalization ofcapital outflows may encourage
inflows by convincing foreign investors that they will be able to get their
money out.
Chile's approach may be too cautious. In particular, saturation of the
domestic market would come sooner in smaller countries, suggesting a
need to relax investment rules at a much earlier stage and to a much
larger extent. The new scheme in Argentina permits investments of up to
10 percent in foreign securities from the start.
Regulating Fees and Commissions
In principle, competition among plan administrators should make reg-
ulation of fees and commissions unnecessary. In practice, agency and
information problems often lead to distortions in the structure of fees
and commissions, as Chile's experience suggests. Since mandatory saving
schemes are, by definition, compulsory, and economies of scale in the
pension industry may result in concentration, investment companies
may end up charging more than they would in a purely voluntary com-
petitive scheme.
Chile regulates the types of fees that AFPs can levy but not the level of
fees or the structure of commissions paid to agents. Authorized fees
include a fixed fee per contribution, a prorated fee on wages subject to
pension contribution, fees for opening new accounts, fees per pension
payment, and fees for voluntary savings accounts. No AFP has imposed
the last two fees, and only one has levied a fee on new accounts. Fees may
not be assessed for closing an account, to prevent AFPs from discourag-
ing account transfers. AFPs were initially allowed to charge a manage-
ment fee on the total value of funds under their management, but this
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fee has since been disallowed because of its depleting effect on the ac-
counts of those who were out of work and no longer contributing.
The flat fee per contribution is probably the most controversial. This
fee would seem to be regressive, but it may simply reflect the real costs of
handling an account. This fee was high in the early years of the program,
leading to lower net rates of return to lower income workers, but compe-
tition combined with negative publicity has led most AFPs to abolish or
greatly diminish it. A prorated fee ofabout 1.5 percent of covered wage is
currently the major fee, and net returns have been largely equalized
across income groups (Acuna and Iglesias 1992).
Keeping a Ud on Operating Costs
Decentralized systems that allow workers to choose management com-
panies and transfer accounts tend to incur higher operating costs than
efficiently run centralized plans. Decentralized systems cannot achieve
the same economies ofscale, they incur high marketing and transactions
(Switching) costs, and they perform additional functions, such as invest-
ment research and processing (which may, however, result in higher rates
of return). At the same time, decentralized plans have more incentive to
operate efficiently than centralized plan that have a monopoly in a com-
pulsory system. These factors help explain why, in 1990, operating costs
were 1.5 percent of covered wages and 2.3 percent of total assets in
Chile's decentralized system, compared with 0.2 percent and 0.1 percent
in Singapore's and 0.4 percent and 0.2 percent in Malaysia's centralized
systems, while the costs of Zambia's centralized system were 25 times
higher than Singapore's and ate up halfof all contributions (Table 3).
Competition may be very imperfect in financial markets that are serv-
ing a mass, relatively uneducated clientele. Where investors are unable to
collect and analyze information about prospective rates of return, they
ar.e susceptible to intensive marketing campaigns, which create barriers
to entry and increase costs. Promotional expenses are estimated to ac-
countJor as'much as 30 percent of operating costs for Chile's AFPs.
Paying salespeople by commission leads to high turnover ofaccounts and
high transaction costs, which are eventually passed on to consumers in
the form of high fees. Advertising campaigns also tend to emphasize
short-term performance.
Requiring companies to provide data on fees and commissions as well
as investment performance over longer periods (three, five, and 10
years) would provide a more accurate picture of relative returns and
might also help to keep operating costs down. Marketing costs and ac-
count turnover would decline if transfers, which workers might choose
during an open enrollment period, were limited to one per year. Market-
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ing costs might also fall if AFPs were allowed to pass along the savings to
long-term affiliates in the form of a bonus on their rate of return or a
reduction in their required fee. The entry of new AFPs in a competitive
market may eventually lead to lower costs and fees. Economies of scale
and learning by doing as the system grows will undoubtedly enhance
efficiency. Indeed, costs fell dramatically through the 1980s, are now
about 1.6 percent oftotal assets, and are lowest for the largestAFPs.3
Regulatory Annuities
Under Chile's mandatory retirement saving program, workers must pur-
chase term life and disability insurance. Chile's scheme also provides for
the voluntary purchase of annuities at the time of retirement. These
insurance-related elements give rise to a host ofpotential problems in the
annuities market.
In Chile, insurance agents receive large commissions up front, giving
them an incentive to withhold information or to shade the truth in order
to gain a customer. Since the purchase ofan annuity is an irreversible act,
a wrong decision by an ill-informed retiree may have disastrous conse-
quences that cannot be readily corrected. Chile imposes no restrictions
on these commissions or on the sale or range ofacceptable annuity prod-
ucts, other than to require price indexation, but it is considering various
measures to control commissions and inform workers about their op-
tions. One proposal is to limit annuity products to two or three standard
options, such as partially indexed life annuities for the retiree combined
with survivor benefits for a 10- or 20-year period, or joint annuities that
cover the entire lifetime of the retiree plus a designated beneficiary. That
would simplifY comparison shopping for annuities offered by different
companies. Broad disclosure on premiums and commissions would also
be required. Other proposals call for independent professional advisers
to assist retirees in evaluating annuity choices and for the establishment
ofan ombudsman to investigate complaints and arbitrate disputes. These
proposals, which focus on increased information flows, should help the
market work better. Some analysts believe that increased competition will
eventually lead insurance companies to move toward direct sales of an-
nuities, which would reduce the price by cutting out the commission.
Another problem concerns the worker's exposure to the risk ofa sharp
decline in the market at the time of retirement, when the annuity is
purchased. This risk could be reduced by requiring workers to purchase
small annuity contracts periodically once they reach a predetermined
age, such as 50. By reducing the lumpiness of the purchase this method
would diversifY the interest rate risk, but would, at the same time, increase
workers' exposure to the risk of insurance company insolvency, making
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regulation of fiduciary standards all the more important. The timing
problem could be mitigated more effectively by developing variable an-
nuities, whose value would rise and fall with the market rather than being
fixed at the retirement date. This would reduce the worker's to market
conditions at retirement time, but would continue the investment risk
throughout retirement. Such variable annuities are used in South Africa
and the United States. Caps on annual movements in value of variable
annuities might make this risk more acceptable to retirees. Similar vari-
able instruments, with caps on annual movements, have been developed
in the mortgage markets.
Monitoring Compliance by Investment Companies
Close monitoring of investment company behavior is essential to ensure
compliance. Supervision in Chile's AFP system includes daily reports on
investment transactions and monthly reports on each company's finan-
cial position and performance. Compliance with investment limits is
monitored continuously. On-site inspections are undertaken periodically
to ensure the accuracy of submitted returns. Though the arrangement
works well in Chile, countries with weaker regulatory capacity might have
difficult time in effectively monitoring decentralized firms.
Chile's system is supervised and controlled by the Superintendency of
AFPs, an autonomous agency linked to the Ministry of Labor and Social
Security. The Superintendent is appointed by the President, and the
agency enjoys considerable independence and authority. The Superin-
tendency has the right to authorize and revoke the license of AFPs, to
issue detailed regulations for the smooth functioning of the system, and
to promote changes in the law. The agency, which employs more than 100
lawyers, financial auditors, examiners, and others, supervises the invest-
ment of AFPs, the operation of profitability reserves, the crediting of
member contributions, and the payment of pensions.
An ever present danger in regulatory systems is that the regulated will
"capture" the" regulators and prevent them from operating effectively.
Although this does not seem to have happened in Chile, countries with a
weaker regulatory capacity might have a more difficult time monitoring
decentralized firms. Countries should assess their institutional and hu-
man capital capacities for regulating effectively before understanding a
decentralized mandatory saving plan.
Guaranteeing Pensions and Pension Returns
Various types of government guarantees are designed to ensure at least
some pension coverage for everyone. In countries with mandatory saving
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plans social assistance is often provided to people who are not covered by
the scheme and a minimum return or minimum pension may be guaran-
teed to those who are covered. These guarantees have a redistributive
function and are usually financed out ofgeneral revenues.
Singapore provides modest benefits (12 percent of the average wage)
to poor old people, widows, and orphans through a social assistance
program financed from general revenue. It specifies the rate of return
that is paid to the provident fund. But it does not provide a guaranteed
minimum pension.
Chile's system includes four types of state guarantees. First, the govern-
ment pays a low social assistance benefit of about 12 percent of the aver-
age wage to old people not covered by the mandatory saving plan. Sec-
ond, for workers who have contributed to the mandatory saving plan for
at least 20 years, the state guarantees a minimum pension of about 22 to
25 percent of the average wage. Third, a minimum profitability rate is
guaranteed for each pension fund relative to the average for the country.
Any shortfall in rate of return is covered first through the profitability
reserve and then through the investment reserves of the AFP. If these are
inadequate, the AFP is forced into liquidation, and the state makes up the
shortfall. Finally, the government guarantees annuity payments for old
age pensions and disability and survivorship benefits in case of insurance
company failure. The guarantee covers 100 percent of the minimum
pension and 75 percent of the difference between the minimum pension
and the value of the benefit involved up to a specified limit. These guar-
antees are financed out ofgeneral revenues.
What are the likely costs of such guarantees? As long as the rate of
return remains at least two percentage points above the growth rate of
wages, most people who work full-time during their active years (about 40
years) will receive a pension far above the minimum without any public
transfers (Table 1). But a problem arises if low income workers contri~
ute just long enough to quality for the subsidized minimum pension (20
years) and then escape to the informal sector to avoid making further
payments. As many as 30 to 40 percent of covered workers in Chile may
fall below the minimum if strategic evasion is common or if fund perfor-
mance falls drastically. But even then the government has to make up
only the shortfall between the minimum pension and the benefit payable
by the pension fund.
Simulations indicate that these guarantees will cost less than one per-
cent of GDP, easily absorbed in a country such as Chile that has only a
small budget deficit (Gillion and Bonilla 1992; Diamond and Valdes-
Prieto 1994; Wagner 1991). But the cost ofa minimum pension ought to
be carefully calculated in advance to ensure that the state is not taking on
a large unfunded liability that it will be unable to meet. If the cost is
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expected to be high, the minimum guarantee should be lowered or the
required contribution rate raised, unless the government wishes to use
general revenue finance as a redistributive instrument.
A contrasting problem is that a minimum pension of22 to 25 percent
of the average wage, as in Singapore and Chile, is well below the poverty
line in most countries and the social assistance of 12 percent is below
subsistence. One way to attack both the evasion and the poverty problems
is to guarantee a higher minimum pension to workers who have contrib-
uted for more years. For example, the guarantee could be set equal to 12
percent ofthe average economy-wide wage (the universal floor for every-
one over age 65) plus 5 percent for every year of contributing and em-
ployment, up to a specified maximum. A worker with 20 years of service
would then be guaranteed 22 percent of the average wage and one with
45 years' service would be guaranteed 35 percent, which might be the
maximum guarantee. Given the 10 percent contribution rate and the
link to years of employment, this scheme would not cost the government
much more than the current one in Chile, and might even cost less.
Conclusion
Mandatory personal saving schemes require workers to accumulate a
pool of long-term savings for consumption in old age. Since the schemes
are not tied to place of employment, they are more portable and diversity
risk more than occupational plans. They are also likely to be more con-
centrated and therefore benefit more from economies of scale than oc-
cupational plans. Since they make benefits directly contingent on contri-
butions, they are less likely than public plans to induce evasion and shifts
of labor to the informal sector. Political pressures for poor design fea-
tures-such as early retirement, non-sustainable pension levels, and hid-
den redistribution to influential groups-are avoided because each per-
son's contribution determines the benefits that person ultimately gets. If
e~ion or early retirement does take place, the costs are borne by the
individual worker, not by others in the plan.
Manda~ory saving schemes have the potential to stimulate capital ac-
cumulation and the development of modern financial instruments and
institutions. But if governments are given exclusive or favored access to
the funds, many of these potential advantages are lost. When the pension
funds are publicly managed, they are invariably required to be invested in
government debt as a source of general revenue in return for low nomi-
nal rates of interest that become negative during inflationary periods.
Often the government has used the funds for consumption rather than
productive investments, canceling out the positive effect of these plans
on long-term saving.
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In principle, centralized national provident funds could become com-
petitive by turning them over to one or more private managers on the
basis of competitive bidding and with the authority to invest in private
sector securities. This procedure, which has been considered in Malaysia,
would enable the fund to minimize marketing costs, reap economies of
scale, and possibly earn a higher rate of return. But the potential for
corruption and cronyism in the bidding process would outweigh this
advantage in many countries. Another option would retain centralized
control but passively index the fund to the domestic and international
stock markets, a procedure that is followed in the voluntary occupational
plan for federal government employees in the United States. But many
developing countries lack the necessary securities market for indexation.
In any event, most governments have demonstrated that they do not want
to relinquish privileged access to national provident funds.
Empirical experience indicates that decentralized mandatory saving
schemes are likely to achieve higher returns and allocate capital more
efficiently than centralized schemes. Political interference over invest-
ments is always a possibility, but decentralization makes this explicit and
sets up a constituency against it - private pension funds and their worker
affiliates. The danger is that workers' choice of investment might be ill in-
formed, eventually leaving many people without adequate pensions. Reg-
ulation must walk a fine line between adequately protecting workers and
giving funds enough latitude that competition and investment choice are
not stamped out. To minimize risk:
• Only prudent companies, including joint ventures with experienced
foreign firms, should be allowed to manage pension funds.
• Information disclosure should be emphasized.
• Investments should be diversified and subject to ceilings, not floors.
• There should be no requirement to invest funds in public securities.
• The range of funds, marketing expenses, and annuity products could
be limited in the early years of the system and then gradually ex-
panded.
• Investment in overseas securities should be encouraged in order to
reduce exposure to country-specific risk.
Decentralized mandatory saving schemes will function best in middle
or high income countries with a population well enough informed to
make intelligent investment decisions, with financial markets that offer
(or could be prompted to offer) a variety ofdebt and equity instruments,
and with effective regulatory institutions or the capacity to develop the
institutions quickly. Because financial market development and a regu-
latory apparatus are necessary for continued economic growth of all
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countries, funded pension plans are more viable as countries develop
and can also speed up the development process.
Mandatory saving plans can provide an adequate pension for middle
and high income workers, but they fail to protect workers with low wages
as they grow old or to insure against sharp dips in invesunent perfor-
mance. To alleviate long-term poverty and to help diversify risks, these
plans must be accompanied by a minimum pension guarantee or other
publicly financed redistributive benefits, thereby ensuring old age se-
curity for all.
This chapter draws on and extends chapter 6 of World Bank (1994). The
work is a product of the staff of the World Bank and the judgments made
do not necessarily reflect the views of its Board ofDirectors or the govern-
ment they represent.
Notes
'Major sources on Chile are Acuna and Iglesias (1992); Diamond and Valdes-
Prieto (1994); Gillion and Bonilla (1992); Valdes-PrielO (1993); Vinas and Ig-
lesias (1992); Wagner (1991). For a discussion of broader issues concerning de-
. fined contribution plans see Bodie and Merton (1988); Valdes-Prieto (1994);
Vittas (1992a and b); Vittas and Skully (1991). Additional background is available
in World Bank (1994); see especially chapter 6.
2Most of this literature focuses on public pay-as-you-go schemes and occupa-
tional pension plans. For surveys of this literature see Atkinson (1987) and World
Bank (1994).
'For a further discussion of pension costs see Valdes-Prieto (1993); Mitchell,
Sunden, Hsin, and Reid (1994); andJames and Palacios (1994).
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Comments by AlanJ Auerbach
This is a difficult study to discuss because its arguments are both com-
pelling and non-controversial. In large part, this is because the chap-
ter never really confronts the question its title poses, namely, are man-
datory saving schemes the answer to the old age security problem? What
the chapter does do admirably well is to describe how these forced sav-
ing schemes work, in theory and practice, what the economic and p0-
litical pitfalls are in different approaches, and how these pitfalls can
be overcome. Thus, we are given a manual for how to implement a man-
datory saving scheme, but remain uncertain whether we should do so,
alone or in conjunction with other pension reforms. I do not mean
this as a criticism of the study, but rather of the title. It is not clear ex-
actly what the "old age security problem" is. Indeed, it is probably sev-
eral things, not all of which can be addressed using mandatory saving
schemes.
The chapter does answer a number of important questions about man-
datory saving schemes. Among these are the following.
How can such schemes bejustified?
The primary purpose of such schemes is to give workers a retirement
income that is closely tied to the contributions they make while working.
Unlike a defined benefit plan, in which the benefits tend to be loosely
tied to any implicit or explicit worker contributions, a forced saving
scheme is relatively transparent from the worker's perspective. This has
the economic advantage of reducing the labor supply distortion that
might be associated with systems, like the United States social security
system, in which contributions and benefits are only very loosely related.
It has the reinforcing political advantage of establishing property rights
ofworkers to the accumulating assets.
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How should assets ofsuch schemes be invested?
To preserve the sense of ownership that workers have to their manda-
tory saving accounts, Estelle James and Dimitri Vittas stress the impor-
tance of not allowing the government favorable access to the funds. That
is, there should be no forced holdings of government bonds at below
market interest rates. This objective will be furthered by having private
sector portfolio management.
However, there is a serious question of how much choice individual
workers should have over their investment options. Even in a country like
the United States, with a very developed financial system, there may be a
need to provide such regulation to limit the fleecing of unsophisticated
worker-savers. In a developing country, with developing financial mar-
kets, the problem is likely to be greater.
To me, though, there is an obvious solution, which James and Vinas
view with ambivalence: invest most of the money abroad. In addition to
the usual argument in favor of doing so - that this provides optimal
portfolio diversification - there is the strong advantage of not having to
worry about the shenanigans of local portfolio managers or the stability
of the domestic economy. The chapter suggests at one point that such
overseas investment should occur only gradually, once domestic invest-
ment opportunities have been used up. Otherwise, one of the potential
advantages offorced saving, the access to more investment capital, would
be lost. But this seems inconsistent with the idea of letting investors earn
their best returns. Forcing them to invest domestically is only slightly less
invidious than forcing them to invest in government bonds with below
market returns.
How should retiremmt income be structured?
When workers do near retirement, there is a question of how they
should receive their accumulated funds. A simple answer is to give them a
lul'lP sum and leave the decision up to them. As James and Vinas point
out, though, this goes against one of the reasons for having the forced
saving in the first place, that workers need protection against their own
myopia. The lump sum may be spent quickly, leaving the elderly without
the assets needed to finance consumption. The authors favor forcing
retirees to buy an annuity with some or all of the funds. To prevent
adverse selection, they advocate forcing this to be done upon retirement.
But they worry about the fact that this exposes retirees to "investment
risk" in the sense that, on the day their assets are converted into an annu-
ity, the market may be "abnormally low." I am not sure what abnormal
means in this context, nor do I see the obvious benefit to the "smooth-
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ing" of annuity purchases over a period of several years. But I do agree
with their alternative solution, which is to allow the use ofvariable as well
as fixed annuities. James and Vittas suggest that one problem of private
annuity provision is overall longevity risk, because this cannot be pooled
and may cause annuity providers to become insolvent. I do not see why
this is a problem, as long as the rate paid on the annuity is allowed to vary
with group mortality experience.
Can mandatory saving schemes help the current elderly?
The chapter argues that a mandatory saving scheme is, by its nature, a
funded scheme. Thus, it cannot be used to bailout current retirees.
Although I agree in substance, there is nothing preventing the govern-
ment from issuing marketable debt as it establishes the scheme, and
giving this debt to the current elderly to mimic the assets they would have
accumulated had the system been in force while they were working. (See,
e.g., Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff, 1992.) Why one would wish to do
so is another matter.
Can mandatory saving schemes be usedjar redistribution within a cohort?
James and Vittas argue that a forced saving scheme "can provide an
adequate pension for middle and high income workers, but fails to pro-
tect workers with low wages as they grow old." They argue that an old age
pension plan needs low income supplements to make it work. This is, of
course, the philosophy behind the United States social security system,
but it makes no sense to me. If an individual has low wages his or her
entire life, and is forced to save the same fraction of these wages as a
higher income individual, in what sense is the resulting asset accumula-
tion inadequate? It is inadequate to provide the low wage individual the
high wage individual's standard ofliving, but it may be perfectly adequate
to maintain the low wage individual at his or her own lifetime living
standard. The issue, in other words, is not old age poverty, but all poverty.
Why should there be a separate program for the poor elderly? But, then,
why should other countries be more rational about this issue than we
have been?
In short, then, forced saving schemes can be used to insure against
worker myopia or the equivalent problem of individuals purposely not
saving for their old age because they believe that society will take care of
them if they do not. The schemes should not be viewed as a source of
cheap capital or as a means for redistributing income. However, there is
significant benefit to attacking different problems with different pro-
grams. This will protect mandatory saving schemes from political pres-
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sure. It may also lead policymakers to reevaluate the logic of their dif-
feren t goals.
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Comments by Donald S. Grubbs, Jr:
This stimulating chapter provides information and ideas on mandatory
savings schemes in developing countries. I also find it interesting to con-
sider how the concepts might apply to the United States and other indus-
trialized countries, and in turn how the experience of industrialized
countries applies to developing countries (see also Watson, Salazar, and
Stroinski, 1993).
Mandatory savings schemes serve the dual purposes of providing capi-
tal formation and meeting retirement income needs. James and Vittas
recognize that the mandatory savings schemes leave gaps in meeting
retirement income needs, and accordingly they state that such programs
must be supplemented by a public program that ensures a basic income
floor. They do not report the extent to which most countries that have
established a mandatory savings scheme have such a public basic income
floor. In the United States the social security system provides a basic
income floor, and public policy encourages voluntary programs estab-
lished by employers to supplement the basic income floor, but somewhat
fewer than 50 percent ofall private sector employees are participants in a
plan of their current employer. To solve this problem in 1970 I began
advocating that a mandatory supplemental program be established in
the United States; in 1981 the President's Commission on Pension Policy
endorsed a variation of my proposal (PCPP 1981).
Lifetime Inflation-Adjusted Incomes
A primary reason for having a mandatory system is that individuals need
the retirement income that it can provide. Ifsuch a system is to succeed, it
must assure that the income will continue throughout the lifetime of the
retiree (and the retiree's spouse where appropriate). The income needs
to be one that does not increase in purchasing power during the retire-
ment years. To the extent that retirement benefits do not continue
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throughout the retiree's lifetime and keep pace with inflation, a program
fails in meeting human needs.
James and Vittas discuss the difficult problem facing defined contribu-
tion plans in providing such a flow of income to meet retirement needs.
Many of the programs described are clearly failures in this regard. The
failure of countries to adopt programs that can meet retirement income
needs may be the result of faulty analysis or shortsightedness, but it
should not be surprising. Many U.S. employers and individuals are follow-
ing the same shortsighted approach.
Most employees are not able to convert a lump sum distribution into a
lifetime income that keeps pace with inflation. Chile's alternative of pro-
viding an income for the number of years in the retiree's life expectancy
may leave about half of retirees destitute in their later years.
It was encouraging to read that the marketplace in some countries has
responded by making available inflation-adjusted life annuities, financed
through inflation-indexed bonds. Mandatory defined contribution sys-
tems would better accomplish their objectives if they were required to
make all distributions in the form of indexed life annuities, funded ei-
ther with private insurers or a federal portability system. (For a discussion
of how such a system might work see Grubbs 1983.)
The authors describe the "perverse redistribution" that results from
pooling people with long and short life expectancies. Of course every
issuance of annuities is based upon such pooling. A system may pool
males and females, educated and uneducated individuals, smokers and
non-smokers, overweight and average weight individuals, people of dif-
ferent races, healthy individuals and those with health problems, and so
on. These various groups have differing life expectancies, and an argu-
ment can be made that the amount of annuity provided to each category
should differ accordingly. While not recognizing all such differences in
experience can arguably be termed "redistribution," it is not necessarily
perverse. Women, for example, have as much need for monthly income
as men. Making determinations of which distinctions in life expectancy
to recognize and which not to recognize, and making determinations of
who is in which group and how much annuities should vary for each
group,.can waste dollars in administration that would be better spent
providing benefits, and can create as many inequities as it relieves.
Governmental or Private Operation of the Programs
The programs described by the authors are defined contribution plans
that fall into two categories: "provident funds" administered by the gov-
ernment and privately managed programs. The privately managed pro-
grams are invested primarily in corporate stocks and bonds, while the
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provident funds are invested in governmental obligations that have been
less effective in contributing to long-term saving and capital market de-
velopment and that have generally provided lower rates of return. The
authors indicate that investment in governmental securities is a disadvan-
tage of provident funds. Apparently none of the developing countries
have tried having a governmentally administered program invested in
private sector investments and the authors do not discuss this possible
alternative. In the United States we have two examples of governmental
investment of pension funds in private sector investments, the trust
funds of terminated pension funds being administered by the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the Thrift Savings Plan for federal
employees.
The authors report that Malaysia and Singapore have allowed theprov-
ident funds and equivalent private plans to operate side by side, but that
in practice most private plans have been absorbed into the provident
funds. It would be helpful to know why most employers have elected to
use the provident funds, and to consider designing a program that would
encourage both programs to operate simultaneously. This has a parallel
to the United Kingdom andJapan, which allow employers to contract out
of the public program if they provide equivalent benefits. If contracting
out is perrrlltted, it would be logical also to allow contracting out by
employers with defined benefit plans that provide equivalent benefits.
Contribution Rates, Benefit Levels and Rates of Return
James and Vittas's first table shows that a program that indexes pensions
to inflation, that has a passivity rate (ratio of payout years to accumula-
tion years) of one-third and a zero real rate of return requires contribu-
tions of 13 percent of pay to provide pensions of 40 percent of the final
rate of pay, but would require contributions of 20 percent if the passivity
rate were one-half. The United States social security system is fairly com-
parable, since workers who work 45 years and retire at age 65 have a
passivity rate of about 1/2.5 and receive benefits that have a median of
approximately 43 percent of pay (decreasing to about 37 percent for
future retirees). Costs of the OASI (Old Age and Survivor Insurance)
program are currently 10.2 percent of pay but are projected to increase
to 16.1 percent in 75 years. Thus the benefits and costs of the OASI pro-
gram are roughly comparable to the benefits and contributions shown
for the mandatory savings scheme with a zero real rate of return. How-
ever, their Table 1 shows that, if the real rate of return can be increased to
2 percent, required contributions are cut approximately in half. Thus
maximizing the rate of return within acceptable levels ofrisk is extremely
important for the funded system.
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Investment in Government Securities
James and Vittas state that, by investing in government securities, the
provident funds receive lower returns and "can involve capital and labor
market distortions and capricious redistributions similar to those in
many public defined benefit plans." Lower returns are a natural con-
comitant of low risk securities, but investing in government bonds does
not necessarily affect capital and labor markets significantly differently
than investing in corporate bonds. While any significant economic pro-
gram distorts capital and labor markets from what they would otherwise
be, such distortions can have both positive and negative effects. In the
United States, for example, the social security system has tended be a
stabilizing factor in the economy, helping slightly to reduce the erratic
swings in capital and labor markets. The redistributions ofsuch programs
are usually not capricious, but are intentional and carefully planned.
The trust funds of the United States social security system are invested
in United States government securities, but this has little effect upon the
total outstanding governmental securities. The total outstanding govern-
mental securities must be sufficient to finance the excess of governmen-
tal expense over governmental income. If the social security system's
trust funds were to switch from purchasing United States government
bond to purchasing corporate bonds, the Treasury would merely have
to sell more bonds in the public marketplace. The greater demand for
corporate bonds and lower demand for governmental bonds would tend
to decrease interest rates for corporate bonds and increase interest rates
for government bonds. Greater investment returns of the social security
system's trusts would reduce the cost of the social security system, but
higher interest rates on government bonds would increase the general
revenue expense. Thus by purchasing government bonds instead ofpri-
vate sector securities, social security systems and provident funds tend to
subsidize general revenues.
However, the authors were not discussing this minor subsidy through
interest rates, but rather the tendency of some governments actually to
spend more because the provident funds provide the facility to finance
government debt. The authors apparently believe that this facility has
reduced a discipline that would otherwise restrain governmental spend-
ing in some countries, and I assume that there is a basis for this assertion.
On the other hand, if government spending is required for development
and other needs and if the government has limited ability to finance its
debt, this facility may enable the government to make needed expendi-
tures that it would not otherwise be able to make. In addition, financing
part of the government's debt through the provident funds will help hold
down the itlterest rate not only on the debt held by the provident fund
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but on all the government's debt. Any government must balance the
advantages and disadvantages of these approaches.
Other Investment Considerations
For privately managed investments, the authors point to the advantage of
investing in foreign assets to provide diversification. This also introduces
an exchange rate risk, particularly if there is a possibility that the cur-
rency of the investing country will generally become stronger in the
future. This is not a reason to exclude foreign investments, but it is a
consideration in deciding how extensive they should be.
The chapter describes the problems of decentralized private invest-
ment, which include malfeasance and the regulatory burden of attempt-
ing to control it, the additional expense resulting from individuals'
switching back and forth between competing funds, and the charges for
commissions and other selling costs. All such problems can be avoided by
utilizing a single governmentally administered fund invested in private
sector investments, the approach taken in the United States by the trust
funds of terminated pension funds being administered by the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the Thrift Savings Plan for federal
employees.
The Thrift Savings Plan invests in equities using the index fund
method. This method not only reduces investment expenses but in most
periods produces higher rates of return than most actively managed
pension funds. It also removes the government from political consider-
ations in making investment decisions. Some developing countries may
lack a suitable index for this approach.
Because of the fungibility of assets, whether an additional dollar of
retirement savings is invested in government bonds or private sector
investments may have little effect on the allocation of capital. If the new
dollar is invested in government bonds, that amount of bonds will not be
purchased by other investors, who will then have one more dollar avail-
able for private sector investments. This will not be the case, however, if
the purchase ofgovernment bonds causes the government to make more
total expenditures and to issue more bonds.
The authors raise the specter of backdoor socialism if a governmental
program controls private sector investments, and particularly if it ex-
ercises control through voting rights. This is usually not a problem with
debt instruments. The problem can be avoided for equities if the govern-
ment avoids voting its stock.
The authors list potential problems if employees are not permitted to
make investment choices. In my opinion most employees would be better
served by having diversified investments made either by professional
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portfolio managers of a single fund or by the index method, resulting
in better gross investment results and lower sales and administrative
expenses.
Conclusion
Mandatory savings schemes can provide little retirement income for
those who are close to retirement at the time the program is established.
Therefore a universal defined benefit system is essential to meeting re-
tirement income needs, at least until the mandatory savings scheme has
been in effect for many years. Even then, the mandatory savings scheme
will be ineffective in meeting retirement income needs to the extent it
does not have the following characteristics:
• universal coverage;
• mandatory application of the account balances to provide a lifetime
income for the retiree, and for the retiree's spouse if applicable;
• cost ofliving adjustments after the pension commences.
Even if a mandatory savings scheme is not fully effective because it does
not completely meet these criteria, it may still be a very valuable supple-
ment to the basic defined benefit program of a social insurance system.
For the United States such an addition would help millions of workers
achieve adequate retirement incomes and would substantially increase
capital formation.
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